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ABSTRACT 
The Dynamic Positioning (DP) System is a complex system 
with significant levels of integration between many sub-
systems to perform diverse control functions. The extent of 
information managed by each sub-system is enormous. The 
complex level of integration between sub-systems creates 
more possible failure scenarios. A systematic analysis of all 
failure scenarios is tedious and for an operator to handle 
any such catastrophic situation is breath taking. There are 
many accidents where a failure in a DP system has resulted 
in fatalities and environmental pollution.  Therefore, 
reliability assessment of a DP system is critical for safe and 
efficient operation of marine and offshore vessels. 
Traditionally, the reliability of a DP system is assessed 
during the design stage by methodologies such as Failure 
Mode Effects and Analysis (FMEA), Proving Trials, 
Hardware In-the Loop (HIL) testing, Site-Specific Risk 
Analysis, DP capability Analysis and during operation by 
annual trials to verify functionality. All these methods are 
time consuming, involving a lot of human effort and notably 
no analysis of previous accidents are indicated in the 
reliability assessment. This imposes in-built uncertainty and 
risk in DP system during operation.  
In this paper, a new concept of Dynamic Positioning 
Reliability Index (DP-RI) is introduced and a state-of-the-
art advisory decision making tool is proposed. This tool is 
developed based on information from various sources 
including Offshore Reliability Data (OREDA), International 
Marine Contractors Association (IMCA) Accident database, 
DP vendor equipment failure databases, DP System 
supplier's manuals, previous system level FMEA and HIL 
testing results, Site specific risk analysis documents, Project 
design specification and Operator’s operational 
experiences.  Thus, DP-RI addresses the pitfalls of existing 
reliability assessment methods and will be an efficient tool 
in reducing the number of DP-related accidents. 
INTRODUCTION 
In today’s world of challenging environments where offshore 
and marine vessels operate with high precision, within meters 
of each other with no options for mooring, the need for safe 
and reliable positioning is particularly important to prevent 
injury to people and damage to property. In this high pressure 
and intense environment, the potential for risk and probability 
of accidents has increased. The consequences of loss of 
position can be severe, so the need for reliable and safe 
systems is greater than ever.  The Dynamic Positioning (DP) 
system is the only viable option. DP systems have been 
developing since the 1960’s and as the oil and gas industry 
operates in deeper and deeper waters, vessels without DP 
cease to be an option. For vessels with DP systems, the most 
critical safety incidents are loss of position and/or heading. 
Therefore, it is necessary to design DP systems to be fault 
tolerant and fault resistant systems [1]. This is to ensure that 
the complex vessel, operating in a harsh environment, could 
be safer, reliable and efficient. 
Figure.1 shows the vessel’s six Degrees of Freedom (DOF) 
which includes translatory motions: surge, sway and heave 
and angular motions roll, pitch and yaw. These motions 
contribute to the dynamics experienced by a vessel operating 
in a deep-water environment. The six DOF equations of 
motion representing the kinetic and kinematics of a DP vessel 
can be represented as Equation (1) [2] 
𝑀𝑀?̇?𝑣 + 𝐶𝐶(𝑣𝑣)𝑣𝑣 + 𝐷𝐷(𝑣𝑣)𝑣𝑣 + 𝑔𝑔(ƞ) = 𝜏𝜏 + 𝑔𝑔𝑜𝑜 + 𝑤𝑤     (1) 
Where 𝑀𝑀 - system inertia matrix (including added mass) 
𝐶𝐶(𝑣𝑣)- Coriolis-centripetal matrix (including added mass) 
𝐷𝐷(𝑣𝑣)- Damping matrix 
𝑔𝑔(ƞ)- vector of gravitational/buoyancy forces and moments 
𝜏𝜏 - vector of control inputs 
𝑔𝑔𝑜𝑜 - vector used for pre-trimming (ballast control) 
w - vector of environmental disturbances (wind, waves and 
currents) 
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Figure 1. Dynamics of Vessel with Six DOF [3] 
The dynamics of the vessel presented in Equation (1) also 
represent the physical properties of the system which are 
further used for control system design. The advanced DP 
system, by design, is itself a complex system with significant 
levels of integration between many sub-systems to perform 
diverse control functions. In addition, the external 
environment affects the overall performance. Therefore, it is 
necessary to perform reliability assessment and risk analysis 
of the complex system to identify the factors contributing to 
loss of position and/or heading or, worst case design failure 
[4]. 
The major phases of the DP life-cycle include design, 
construction, commissioning, sea-trials and operation. In all 
of these phases, the design evolves and changes are 
implemented for safe, reliable and efficient operation. 
Historically several traditional reliability assessment 
methods have been implemented in different phases for 
improving the design of the system. However, they have not 
made a significant contribution in the prevention of all the 
accidents or reducing the number of accidents based on the 
analysis of the accident database report from IMCA [5]. In 
addition, the traditional reliability assessment methods have 
not demonstrated their ability to provide clear information 
on faults and provide appropriate solutions during operation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The analysis of existing reliability assessment methods 
revealed key drawbacks which are listed below: 
• Lack of user knowledge and experience from previous 
incidents / accidents. 
• Lack of consideration of interdependencies between sub-
systems. 
• Lack of consideration of the relatively short reaction 
time available for an operator to take corrective actions.  
In this paper a new concept of DP-RI is introduced. This is a 
qualitative and quantitative representation of reliability of 
the system.
To date, such a method has never been used for Risk Analysis 
or analyzing the reliability of a DP system during operation. 
This is a qualitative and quantitative representation of the 
reliability of the system. The biggest break-through is that this 
tool uses the industry experience from previous accidents / 
incidents and industry experts’ inputs during operation.  In 
addition, a state-of-the-art advisory decision making tool is 
proposed which is based on a predictive analytics concept 
This is based on a machine learning algorithm, Extreme 
Learning Machine (ELM) for predicting the DP-RI value 
based on the input from an operator and the plan of the 
operation for simulation analysis. It clearly bridges the gaps 
in existing reliability assessment and will aid operators in 
preventing accidents. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The levels of complexity and sophistication of DP systems 
have developed incredibly over the last few decades. The 
advancement in DP has undoubtedly been instrumental in the 
creation of a new design for vessels and, at the same time, 
many new vessel types have been introduced to the market 
[6]. 
The overall DP system comprises different equipment and 
systems that directly and indirectly affect the position keeping 
/ heading of the vessel. The reliability of DP Systems directly 
depends on various system aspects such as equipment 
selection, design, architecture, functionality, integration, 
verification, codes and standards, rules and regulations [7].  
The reliability of DP systems depends on the redundancy of the 
equipment, so that a sudden failure of one item of equipment or 
an inadvertent act will not cause an unexpected loss of vessel 
position and/or heading. In addition, the reliability indirectly 
depends upon third party DP design consultation, FMEA, HIL, 
operational planning and procedures, training of operating 
personnel, company safety policies, local authority and 
government rules and regulations. [8] 
The different types of traditional reliability assessment of DP 
systems in different phases of the life cycle are listed below: [8] 
[9] 
• FMEA (System Level Independent FMEA) 
• DP capability Analysis 
• HIL testing 
• Site Specific Risk Analysis 
• Operational Procedure and Maintenance System 
All the above-mentioned methods are governed by industry 
rules, standards, recommended practices, guidelines and 
regulations. Depending on vessel operator preference and 
vessel specific application either one or more of the traditional 
reliability assessment methods may be used to verify the DP 
system design.  
Most of the traditional reliability assessment methods place 
more importance on the redundancy of the design due to 
misinterpretation of rules and standards. Often the reliability is 
determined by redundancy level in the system which is in-
correct as those are completely different concepts and not 
synonymous [7].  
 
 
Figure 2. Life cycle of a DP system 
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The DP system requirement has been divided into equipment 
classes 1, 2 and 3 based on the system reliability in “IMO 
MSC circular 645 Guidelines for vessels with dynamic 
positioning systems” by the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) [4], as presented in Table 1. 
All major classification societies have prepared rules, 
standards and guidance for DP systems, based on the IMO 
three levels of equipment classes, with minor differences. 
Similarly, most of the traditional reliability assessment is 
performed during the design stage but these do not provide 
true representation of reliability during DP operation. 
System Level Independent FMEA: This is a systematic 
method to analyze the system by identifying the potential 
failure modes, their causes and effects on the overall system 
[10]. The assessment involves two phases i.e. Desktop FMEA 
and Proving trial. The desktop FMEA of the DP system is 
limited only to hardware (HW) parts and the Proving trial tests 
only part of the input-output (IO) layer in the control system. 
The guide from IMCA doesn’t not provide any guidance for 
FMEA on how to use the experience from previous DP failure 
incidents. 
DP capability Analysis: The analysis defines the vessel’s 
station-keeping ability under given environmental and 
operational conditions. The IMCA specification is quite basic 
allowing the analysis to be computed with environmental 
forces and non-vessel-specific co-efficient. In addition, 
thruster force from a generic rule-of-thumb can be considered 
without including the specification of the DP control system 
and thruster allocation. 
HIL testing: This testing involves validation of the control 
logic part and ensures that the control system performance is 
satisfactory at all layers of software. Experience has shown 
that a lack of understanding of the interfaces and shared 
functionality between various systems results in the vessel 
design deviating from class rules [11]. All the testing related 
to HIL is simulation based and, in real time, the dynamics and 
transients of the system could be completely different. 
Site Specific Risk Analysis: Due to increase in awareness 
created by DP related accidents, new site specific risk analysis 
techniques have been introduced to perform reliability 
assessment. The tools include Critical Activity Mode of 
Operation (CAMO), Task Appropriate Mode (TAM), 
Activity Specific Operation Guidelines (ASOG) and Well 
Specific Operation Guidelines (WSOG) [12]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Often these guidelines lack structured operational limits criteria 
which are critical for incident free and efficient DP operation. 
Operational Documentation and Maintenance System: As 
per IMO circular 645 [4], the operational document is listed as 
a key document. The vessel specific DP operation manual is the 
most important document for providing guidelines to the 
operator during operation and this is developed during the 
design phase. Often there is a lack of consistency and 
standardization as only certain classification societies have 
requirements defined for the DP operation manual. 
The gap analysis on traditional reliability assessment revealed 
many drawbacks as listed below: 
• The experience from the previous accident database was 
not taken into consideration while performing reliability 
assessment for new vessels. 
• There is always inconsistency in the reliability assessment 
of similar vessels performed by different independent 
consultants. 
• The reports produced through reliability assessment 
contain too much irrelevant information and highlight 
only the possible failure modes. 
• There are no clear solutions and guidelines on the steps to 
be taken in the case of failure. 
• Lack of visibility on Inter-Dependency of sub-systems. 
• No consideration of relatively small response time for 
operators to react and prevent accidents. 
These critical drawbacks are identified from the list as shown 
in Figure 3.  
 
  
Table 1. DP system Equipment Class by IMO 
Equipment Class Definition of Worst-Case Failure Mode 
Equipment Class 1 No Redundancy. 
Loss of position may occur in the event of a single fault 
Equipment Class 2 Redundancy of all active components 
Loss of position will not to occur in the event of a single fault in any active component or 
system. Normally static components will not be considered to fail where adequate protection 
from damage is demonstrated, reliability is to the satisfaction of the administration. 
Single Failure criteria include: 
• Any active component or system (generators, thrusters, switchboards, remote control 
valves etc.) 
Any normally static component (cables, pipes, manual valves, etc.) which are not properly 
documented with respect to protection and reliability 
Equipment Class 3 Redundancy and physical separation of all components. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Existing DP Reliability Assessment – Gap 
Analysis 
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This above gap analysis clearly highlights the need for a new 
approach towards reliability assessment of DP systems. The 
proposed concept of DP-RI addresses these gaps and its 
primary focus is towards bridging these gaps. The concept is 
built upon a large amount of real time data available across 
the industry combined with experts’ knowledge for finding 
the most appropriate solution. This opens up an opportunity 
to address the existing problems in a new direction. 
DYNAMIC POSITIONING RELIABILITY INDEX 
(DP-RI) CONCEPT 
The DP-RI concept is proposed to aid an operator with 
quantitative and qualitative representations of reliability of 
DP systems during complex marine operations. This concept 
is not a replacement method or an alternative solution for the 
current reliability assessment; it will enhance the existing 
reliability assessment results by combining them with a newly 
developed database and industry experts’ knowledge. The DP 
system is classified into various sub-systems using big data 
analysis and a correlation method.  Each of the sub-systems 
has been given a weighting factor and a Reliability Index (RI) 
is calculated based on the DP class type, configuration and 
mode of operation. 
Data Sources 
The Marine, Offshore and Oil & Gas sectors have realized the 
potential of data that they have harvested over the years and 
started leveraging on the knowledge acquired from this data 
for key decision making during operations. This technology 
breakthrough happened when condition based monitoring was 
accepted as an industry wide practice in Oil & Gas. In the 
context of the DP system, which has been in the field for more 
than 60 years, there was a huge volume of data available 
which could have been used in a better way. For the proposed 
DP-RI concept, the data was collected from different 
resources and, based on the category of the data, six different 
databases have been created. Some of the databases were 
created using publicly available data and some were created 
using confidential and privately owned data obtained from 
consulting a company or vendor. The new databases thus 
created are listed as below: 
• FMEA Database: 30 Years of data from DNV GL and 
Noble Denton Experience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• IMCA Accident Database [5]: 35 Years of data collected 
from publications of the IMCA. 
• OREDA Database [13]: More than 50 years of data 
collected and maintained by SINTEF and oil companies. 
• HIL Testing Results Database: 15 Years of testing results 
data from DNV GL and Marine Cybernetics 
• DP capability Plot ERN Database: 30 Years of data from 
DNV GL. 
• Manufacturer Equipment Failure Database: 30 Years of 
data from DP system vendors and DNV GL. 
Big Data DP system classification 
In general, the term DP system means the complete installation 
necessary for dynamically positioning a vessel, consisting of 
following sub-systems [4]: 
• Power System 
• Thrusters / Propulsion System 
• DP control system 
Data analysis was performed on the available databases using 
big data tools including PowerBI and R Script and this 
revealed correlations between different sub-systems. Based 
on the obtained correlations, the DP system is divided into the 
following sub-systems in the DP-RI concept [1] [5]: 
• Power System 
• Thrusters / Propulsion System 
• DP control system 
• Reference System 
• Electrical System 
• Environment System 
• Operator / Human Error 
DP sub-system weighting distribution 
DP sub-systems interact with each other continuously and 
exchange information during operation. Based on the analysis 
of the databases, different sub-systems contribute distinctly to 
the overall vessel performance. Therefore, for calculating the 
DP-RI, a unique weighting factor is assigned to different sub-
systems based on information from the databases, correlation 
analysis and industry experts like vendor control system 
specialists, design engineers, FMEA experts and vessel 
operators.  
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Figure 4. Dynamic Positioning System – Interfaces and sub-systems 
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The assigned weighting distribution for each sub-system is 
indicated in Table 2 [1] [5]. 
Table 2. DP sub-systems weighting distribution 
SNo Sub-System description Weighting 
1 Reference System (A1) 20 
2 DP Control System (A2) 10 
3 Thruster / Propulsion System (A3) 15 
4 Power System (A4) 10 
5 Electrical System (A5) 5 
6 Environment System (A6) 10 
7 Operator / Human Error (A7) 30 
 
Reliability Index Computation (DP-RI Formulation) 
The reliability Index is calculated based on the reliability of 
each sub-system and their weighted contribution to the overall 
vessel DP performance. The DP class type, system 
configuration and mode of operation are taken into 
consideration for accurate representation of DP-RI. With 
careful analysis of the databases, consideration of the 
availability of redundant systems, experience, knowledge 
from previous accidents and input from industry experts 
(consultants, designers, engineers, operators etc.) the RI is 
represented for normal and fault conditions as shown in the 
below equations. 
𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹 (𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄, 𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕) = ((𝟎𝟎.𝟐𝟐𝟎𝟎 ∗ 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨 + 𝟎𝟎.𝑨𝑨𝟎𝟎 ∗ 𝑨𝑨𝟐𝟐 +
𝟎𝟎.𝑨𝑨𝟏𝟏 ∗ 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨 + 𝟎𝟎.𝑨𝑨𝟎𝟎 ∗ 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨 + 𝟎𝟎.𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟏 ∗ 𝑨𝑨𝟏𝟏 + 𝟎𝟎.𝑨𝑨𝟎𝟎 ∗ 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨 +
𝟎𝟎.𝑨𝑨𝟎𝟎 ∗ 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨) ∗ 𝑲𝑲)                                                             (2)                                        
where 
𝑲𝑲 = �    𝑨𝑨  𝒄𝒄𝒊𝒊 𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄 = 𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒏𝒏𝒏𝒏𝒏𝒏𝒏𝒏 , 𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 = 𝒏𝒏𝒏𝒏𝒏𝒏 𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝟎𝟎.𝟖𝟖 𝒄𝒄𝒊𝒊 𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄 = 𝒊𝒊𝒏𝒏𝒇𝒇𝒏𝒏𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕 , 𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 = 𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑨𝑨        
𝟎𝟎.𝑨𝑨 𝒄𝒄𝒊𝒊 𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄 = 𝒊𝒊𝒏𝒏𝒇𝒇𝒏𝒏𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕 , 𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 = 𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝟐𝟐        
𝟎𝟎.𝑨𝑨 𝒄𝒄𝒊𝒊 𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄 = 𝒊𝒊𝒏𝒏𝒇𝒇𝒏𝒏𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕 , 𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 = 𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑨𝑨         
 
OFFLINE FORECASTING / PREDICTIVE 
ANALYTICS OF DP-RI USING SIMULATION TOOL 
In this section, the DP-RI tool is presented which uses 
predictive analytic techniques for offline forecasting of DP 
system reliability. The DP-RI tool is developed with a 
frontend GUI and backend mathematical modelling. Scilab 
software using python programming is used for mathematical 
modelling and predictive analytics. Scilab is an open software 
for numerical computation, simulations, control system 
design & analysis, optimization and statistics. The DP-RI tool 
consists of a graphical user interface where the operator would 
be able to key in the status of sub-systems at any given time 
and estimate the reliability of the DP system. The data sets 
obtained from the databases are used as input to a machine 
learning algorithm to perform predictive analytics. The 
overall DP-RI architecture and framework is shown in Figure 
5. The tool development and information flow for operator 
decisions is presented in Figure 6.
Datasets 
The datasets comprise information from different database 
sources as mentioned in the Data Sources section. The datasets 
presented are collected from different types of vessels. to make 
sure that different application vessels are covered and, at the 
same time, uncertainties are minimized. The data sets are 
prepared to suit the DP-RI tool application.  The data used for 
training of the machine learning algorithm is obtained from 50 
vessels with 3 different DP class type configurations and 5 
different operation modes totaling 1000 samples. Out of 1000 
samples it is categorized into two different groups of datasets 
as below: 
• Training Datasets: This set of samples are used to train the 
machine learning algorithm and 75% of total sample dataset 
created are used. During selection, it is made sure the 
variety of data used covered as much as different 
combination of real time scenario. 
• Testing Datasets: It is used to test the performance of 
machine learning algorithm and 25% of total sample dataset 
created are used. These datasets are completely different 
from training dataset to ensure that algorithm is properly 
trained and predict the correct output. 
Machine Learning Algorithm: Extreme Learning 
Machine (ELM) 
ELM provides a unified solution for a generalized 
feedforward network. In ELM, the input parameters, hidden 
node parameters are randomly generated and output weights 
are computed analytically [14] The unique feature of ELM is 
high accuracy, least user intervention and real-time learning. 
The ELM algorithm can be represented by the following 
steps:. 
Step 1: Define training dataset and choose the number of 
hidden neurons per incremental-decremental procedure. 
Training Data sets: {(𝑢𝑢1, 𝑣𝑣1), … … , (𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 , 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡)}   
Step 2: For each neuron, choose the Gaussian center and their 
width randomly 
Gaussian Centre: 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘 = 1, … … . . ,𝐾𝐾 
Hidden neuron width: 𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘 = 1, … … . . ,𝐾𝐾 
Step 3: Calculate the hidden layer output matrix (H) per the 
ELM algorithm equation. 
𝐻𝐻(𝑈𝑈,𝜇𝜇,𝜎𝜎) =  �ℎ11(𝑢𝑢1,𝜇𝜇1 ,𝜎𝜎1 ) ⋯ ℎ1𝐿𝐿(𝑢𝑢𝐿𝐿 ,𝜇𝜇1 ,𝜎𝜎1 )⋮ ⋱ ⋮
ℎ𝑘𝑘
1(𝑢𝑢1,𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘 ,𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘 ) ⋯ ℎ𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿 (𝑢𝑢𝐿𝐿 ,𝜇𝜇𝐾𝐾 ,𝜎𝜎𝐾𝐾 )�      (3) 
Step 4: Estimate the optimal output weight  
Optimal Output Weight: 𝑊𝑊 = 𝑉𝑉𝐻𝐻↑ 
For any data set with “L” training samples, the regression 
problem is defined to approximate the functional relationship 
as accurately as possible. This will ensure the output 
predictions for the new sample are achieved with greater 
accuracy than would be achieved with statistical and 
mathematical models. An ELM with “m” input neurons and “n” 
output neurons and “K” hidden neurons was designed for this 
problem.  
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Figure 6. Dynamic Positioning Reliability Index (DP-RI) Tool Overview 
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Figure 5. Dynamic Positioning Reliability Index (DP-RI) Architecture and Framework 
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The response of k-th hidden neuron for the “t-th” sample is: 
𝒉𝒉𝒌𝒌
𝒄𝒄 (𝒇𝒇𝒄𝒄,𝝁𝝁𝒌𝒌,𝝈𝝈𝒌𝒌) = 𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒆𝒕𝒕−  (�𝒇𝒇𝒄𝒄−𝝁𝝁𝒌𝒌�𝑻𝑻�𝒇𝒇𝒄𝒄−𝝁𝝁𝒌𝒌�𝟐𝟐 𝝈𝝈𝒌𝒌𝟐𝟐 )                       (4) 
k= 1,….., K. 
From previous studies [15] [16], it is evident that even for 
small data sets the performance of ELM is independent of 
activation functional test. Thus, this paper presents a unified 
approach to estimate the Reliability Index of a Dynamic 
Positioning system independent of the type of vessel, DP class 
type, vessel configuration and mode of operation.  
Performance results  
In this section, the performance results of the ELM in the 
prediction of Reliability Index of DP system are presented. 
The performance of ELM is compared with two other state-
of-the-art machine learning algorithms, Support Vector 
Regression (SVR) [17] and Back-Propagation (BP) [18]. The 
number of hidden neurons and support vectors were selected 
using similar constructive-destructive procedures [20]. The 
Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) and Correlation Coefficient 
(CC) were chosen as performance indices.  
The RSME represents the prediction accuracy and it is defined 
by 
𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹 =  �𝑨𝑨
𝑳𝑳
∑ (𝑽𝑽𝒋𝒋 − 𝑽𝑽�𝒋𝒋)𝑳𝑳𝒋𝒋=𝑨𝑨                                        (5) 
The CC represents the linear dependency of two random 
variables. The linear dependency is strong if CC is greater 
than 0.8 and weak if CC is less than 0.5. 
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 =  𝑪𝑪𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄 (𝑽𝑽,𝑽𝑽�)
�𝑽𝑽𝒏𝒏𝒏𝒏 (𝑽𝑽)𝑽𝑽𝒏𝒏𝒏𝒏(𝑽𝑽�)                                                             (6) 
Table 3. Performance Analysis Results 
SNO MACHINE LEARNING RMSE CC 
1 Extreme Learning Machine 0.1852 0.9518 
2 Support Vector Regression 0.3078 0.8895 
3 Back Propagation 0.2578 0.8789 
 
The ELM network was trained to predict the DP-RI. It was 
trained using the data sets prepared from the FMEA database, 
HIL database, IMCA accident database, DP capability plots, 
OREDA database and Manufacturer Equipment Failure 
database of more than 50 vessels.  
The generalization and forecasting prediction ability of the 
ELM were tested using a statistical approach and real 
operational conditions. The tool’s ability to match the real-life 
scenarios proved its efficiency and performance are within the 
acceptable limits. Thus, the DP-RI tool can be used as a 
training tool, helping operators to understand the reliability of 
a DP system from a more practical aspect. 
RESUTLS AND DISUCSSION 
The results of the tool were found to be more accurate than 
SVR and BP when compared with real cases. The prediction 
and computations are effortless and the method is universal 
when compared to the statistical model based approaches. The 
operator can easily understand the exact reliability of a DP 
system without needing to refer to too much paper 
documentation generated from traditional reliability 
assessment studies. The tool’s ability to predict the reliability 
is accurate as proved through some real-life incident scenarios 
from the IMCA accident database. Two accident scenarios 
were extracted from the IMCA accident database [5] and the 
results of testing with the proposed tool are presented in 
Appendix 1. These two cases occurred in two different vessels, 
at different operating conditions, from two different years. 
For Case 1, in the real scenario the vessel was in DP with 4 
thrusters online, 4 generators online with the bus tie open, 3 
gyros online, 2 MRU (Motion Reference Units) online, 2 wind 
sensors online, 3 DGNSS (Differential Global Navigation 
Sensor Systems) online, 1 HPR (Hydro acoustic Positioning 
Reference System) online and operating in “Follow Target” 
mode performing trenching operations. Due to a DP control 
system computer failure, the vessel moved 24 meters until the 
vessel mode changed to fixed position and vessel stabilized. 
The trencher was dragged across the sea-bead leading to a 
critical incident.  
In the DP-RI tool, a simulation was performed of the same case 
and the predicted Reliability Index is 65%. This clearly 
indicates that the reliability of the DP system has reduced by 
more than 33%. At this situation, it is the responsibility of the 
operator to make sure that the DP computer system failure is 
addressed. The action should have mitigated the accident, 
thereby preventing a position shift. 
For Case 2 in the real scenario, the vessel was in DP with 6 
thrusters online, 4 generators online with the bus tie open, 3 
gyros online, 3 MRU, 2 wind sensors, 2 DGNSS online and 
operating in Station Keeping mode performing drilling 
operations. The 2 DGNSS signals were lost, resulting in 
drifting of the vessel followed by suspension of the drill string 
operation. The operator realized that during the drilling 
operation the third independent position reference signal was 
not available and changed the mode from station keeping to 
manual mode in order to stabilize the vessel to a desired 
position.  
In the DP-RI tool, a simulation was performed of the same case 
with similar setup and it was found that the reliability of the DP 
system was reduced by 50% due to the fact that the third 
position reference system was not available during drilling 
operations. Thus, with this analysis the operator could have 
been alerted that drilling operation with only DGNSS as 
position reference is not recommended. In this way, the tool 
could have acted as an advisory tool and prompted the operator 
to enable the third position reference system before enabling 
the drilling operation. 
Thus, the simulation results of this tool show that the reliability 
value provided to the operator with the necessary information 
would prevent the loss of position and/or heading from a failure 
scenario. The 2 cases presented above clearly demonstrate the 
ability of the DP-RI tool and its effectiveness.
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CONCLUSION 
In this paper, the concept of DP-RI has been presented as an 
offline forecasting / prediction DP-RI advisory tool. This tool 
calculates the reliability of the DP system based on the input 
from the operator for simulation purposes. It helps the 
operator to simulate different operating conditions and the 
status of sub-systems to pre-determine the reliability of the DP 
system and prepare for any specific operating condition.  
This simulation could help an operator to get insights of the 
reliability of the DP system under different fault conditions 
and help to generate solutions even for a worst-case failure 
scenario. 
DP-RI will clearly address the gaps found in the traditional 
reliability assessment methods of a DP system. It proves its 
effectiveness by its following three unique features  
• Knowledge based tool together with of experience from 
previous incidents / accidents. 
• Consideration on interdependencies between sub-
systems and impacts on other systems when a failure in 
one system happens. 
• Reduction in the time spent by an operator on failure 
scenario and aids in preventing accidents. 
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CASE STUDY NO: 1   
 
UNEXPECTED MOVEMENT OF VESSEL TO 24M AWAY FROM TARGET IN “FOLLOW TARGET” MODE 
 
IMCA Accident Database Case 1460: Vessel was in “Follow Target” Mode and unexpectedly drifted 24 meter away from the 
target 
 
Primary Cause as reported in IMCA: Malfunction of DP Operator System Software was identified. 
 
Secondary Cause as reported in IMCA: Human Error was identified. As there was ample of time for operator to stabilize the 
vessel to a stationary position with the help of DP system and trenching could have been stopped eventually. The mode could 
have changed by DP operator and prevented the movement of vessel from the target. 
 
Actual Incident Scenario: Due to a software malfunction in the DP operator station, the vessel started to drift away 24 m from 
target position. The situation was not alerted to the operator by the alarm annunciation system. Thus, the operator was unware 
of the situation. In the reliability assessment studies performed during the basic design process, such a scenario was not studied 
and it left the operator with no information on how to handle such failures.   
Upon a failure situation during operation, the operator would normally refer to FMEA, Operational Procedure and Site-specific 
risk analysis documents to identify the best solution that can be effective to resolve the problem. However, some failures of 
such extent are not captured in any of the above-mentioned documents, thereby leaving the DP operator without any efficient 
tool for decision making in critical situations. 
PROPOSED DP-RI DECISION MAKING TOOL: 
Situation Awareness: DP-RI tool is developed using relevant databases of actual accidents from IMCA, previous industry 
FMEA database, HIL testing findings, DP capability assessment report etc.  This ensures that all possible failures are captured 
in this tool. This will assist DP operator to stay vigilant and to be aware of the situation. Therefore, the DP-RI tool turns out to 
be a reliable tool for different operation modes and the operator can key in their inputs to evaluate and understand the actual 
reliability condition of DP system. 
 
Decision Making Capability:  The DP operator could simulate the above scenario with the DP-RI tool. As shown below in the 
screen shot from the DP-RI tool, a software bug in the DP operator station will have an impact on the reliability of the DP 
control system which in-turn affect the overall reliability of the DP system. As the vessel is DP 3 class, the DP-RI is 65 % and 
the operator would have considered the alternative for such scenarios to prevent the incident from leading to vessel movement 
of 24 m. This clearly shows that the decision-making capability of DP operator increases by simulating the condition using DP-
RI tool and taking precautionary steps preventing the incident from happening. 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX: I  
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CASE STUDY NO: 2 
 
UNAVAILABILITY OF DGNSS POSITIONING SYSTEM AND ENTERNING 500M ZONE INCREASING RISK 
 
IMCA Accident Database Case 1542: Unavailability of both DGNSS positioning units. 
 
Primary Cause:  Position Reference system – Loss of DGNSS signals was identified. 
 
Secondary Cause: Human Error was identified. 
 
Actual Incident Scenario: There was no position signal available from DGNSS for the DP operation.  The DP operator was 
unaware of the situation which lead the vessel to enter the 500m zone where operation of DP Mode with position reference 
system is mandatory. In this incident, the major source of failure is from Human operation error, but it is due to the fact that the 
operator did not have clear guidance about the unavailability of DGNSS signals. This incident highlights the ignorance of DP 
operator and there was no clear guidance / check sheet for him to take decision before entering 500m zone. Although DP 
operation manual have necessary information about such failures, it becomes vessel owner responsibility to highlight criticality 
and importance regarding these signals during a critical or complex marine operation.   
PROPOSED DP-RI DECISION MAKING TOOL: 
Situation Awareness: This case clearly indicates that the DP operator was unaware of the situation. It is industry practice that 
before any DP operation, it is responsibility of DP operator to ensure that all the critical systems are available. From the failure 
report, it is evident that both the DGNSS positioning unit part of the reference systems are not available. Under such 
circumstances, the DP operator should have never enabled the vessel in DP mode for operation into 500m zone as there is a 
greater risk that could lead to an accident. The advantage of DP-RI tool in this case, is that it would have presented the situation 
with much more clarity than any other documentation available on-board. Such tool can also be part of the DP operator daily 
routine checks and work process which enables them to understand a failure of that nature during complex marine operation 
thereby helping them with guidance and decision making process. 
 
Decision Making Capability:  It is possible for the DP operator to simulate the above scenario with the DP-RI tool. As shown 
in the screen shot below from the DP-RI tool, the unavailability of the DGNSS signals would have be easily identified by 
operator. Furthermore, the reliability index calculated by the DP-RI tool is around 50%, which is a clear indication of a low 
reliable condition and the operation could have been stopped to find a solution before entering the 500m zone. Thus, the tool, 
enlightens the DP operator in determining the reason for the low reliability value and provides suggestion to enable the third 
independent position reference signal before starting the operation. 
 
 
